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I. Introduction
In May 2013 Barclays Bank in the UK announced it was shutting down
the accounts of four Somali Money Service Businesses (MSBs) including Dahabshiil, the largest remittance company operating in the Somali
regions. Following international uproar, and a Somali diaspora-led
grassroots campaign, the UK government took on the task of setting
up an Action Group on Cross Border Remittances and a Somali-UK
Safer Corridor Pilot Project with the aim of finding a durable solution
to the problem. Two years later, however, the Safer Corridor Project
has collapsed. Legal remittance flows persist, albeit in a fragile and
precarious environment. This paper provides a brief update on the
Safer Corridor Initiative, its challenges, and how the money transfer
sector has been adapting to the process.1
II. De-Banking
Over the last few years, mounting pressure from international financial regulators and policy makers (particularly in the US and the UK)
has led to tighter regulation around the prevention of money laundering (Anti-money laundering, AML) and the financing of terrorist
activities (Counter-terrorist financing, CFT). The post 9/11 financial
war on terror has meant that banks are expected to abide by Know
Your Customer (KYC) regulations, and are held accountable if their
customers are financing terrorism-related activities or money launder-

34

Mohamed Aden Hassan and Giulia Liberatore

ing. For example, in 2012 HSBC was fined $1.9 billion by US authorities for money laundering offences and lack of controls, and as a
result closed down its MSB accounts. These changes have been part
of a wholesale de-risking and de-banking approach, which has more
recently impacted on the Muslim charity sector in the UK. In 2014, the
accounts of various Muslim organisations, including Finsbury Park
Mosque and the Cordoba Foundation, were closed. Concerns with
regulation have meant that access to financial services has become
increasingly discriminatory, based on perceptions rather than factual
information about the organisations and the countries affected. Muslim organisations, or those linked to unstable, developing countries or
those with a presence of terrorist groups, such as Somalia, have been
unduly affected. This tightening regulation around financial flows has
not been confined to the UK and the US. Earlier this year, the Kenyan
government also shut down the accounts of 13 Somali remittance companies suspected of financing terrorism following al Shabaab’s attack
at Garrissa University where 148 students were killed.2
It is within this global climate that on the 8th May 2013 Barclays
Bank in the UK announced that it planned to shut down the accounts
of 250 MSBs. These closures included four Somali MSBs operating in
the UK: Dahabshiil (the largest in the Somali remittance market and
a major player in the formal economy of the Somali regions), Mustaqbal, Tawakal and Horyaal. This decision came as a result of Barclays Bank weighing up the perceived risks and due diligence costs
against the profitability of banking MSBs.3 The MSB sector has historically been perceived as risky by banks and regulatory authorities, and
banks came to realise that the fines associated with non compliance
with AML and CTF were seen to outweigh the benefits of providing
accounts to MSBs.
This has had severe repercussions on the Somali financial sector.
There are no internationally recognised banks in the region, and only a
very fragile central banking system exists. Consequently, Somali MSBs
are responsible for sending over 1.2 billion USD to the Somali regions,
more than international aid, foreign investment and exports together.4
Furthermore, the system is crucial for providing financial services and
for linking the unbanked with the banked sectors of the population. It
is considered to be cost efficient in contrast to large remittance companies such as MoneyGram and Western Union which are not well represented across the Somali regions and charge considerably more than
most Somali MSBs.5 Aside from WorldRemit,6 which operates online,
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all remittance companies lost their banking accounts in September
2013 as Barclays was the last bank to offer accounts to MSBs in the UK.
As evidence by Oxfam reports, these closures constituted a significant
threat to the Somali lifeline.7
III. The Safer Corridor Pilot
Whilst the UK government was initially reluctant to intervene—citing
the problem as a ‘commercial’ one over which they had little control—
this changed following a 2013 campaign which saw Somali community
activists working alongside academics and NGOs (Oxfam and Adeso).
In October 2013, the government committed to setting up an Action
Group on Cross Border Remittances composed of three working
groups, one of which was in charge of designing and implementing
the Safer Corridor Pilot Project for UK-Somali remittances. The advisory
group overseeing the project included SOMSA, community representatives, banks, regulators, NGOs, international partners and the UK
and Somali governments.
The Safer Corridor Pilot was set up to create “a more transparent
and safer system for Somalis in the UK to send money back home.”8
It aimed to ensure that flows to the Somali regions remained in place,
creating an effective regulatory framework to address banks’ concerns,
while enabling them to re-establish business relations with credible
MSBs. In doing so it sought to initiate various interventions throughout the process of remittances flow—from sender to receiver—thus
addressing security and compliance risks. The UK Department for
International Development (DfID) was the lead department tasked
with funding the project and bringing relevant stakeholders together,
while the World Bank was responsible for the design and implementation of the project. Consult Hyperion were commissioned by the
World Bank to undertake research in the Somali regions, which was
outsourced to another consultancy firm called Katuni. They conducted
a small sample survey in the Somali cities of Galkayo, Hargeysa and
Borama. This consultancy was one of many projects commissioned by
the World Bank and DfID throughout the duration of the Action Group
and Safer Corridor project.9 Consultancy after consultancy nonetheless
failed to provide any tangible results.
One of the prevailing issues to emerge early on in the project was the
necessity of persuading banks to take ownership of the project. While
DfID provided a number of guidelines on compliance for MSBs,10 and
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arranged meetings and discussion groups aimed at persuading banks
to take on remittance accounts, they could not assure banks they would
not be fined should an AML or CFT issue arise. All DfID could do was
improve the perceptions of risk, and support MSBs in strengthening
their compliance procedures. They could not ultimately guarantee that
banks which opened accounts for compliant MSBs would be exempt
from incurring fines if these companies were subsequently found to be
engaged in financial terrorism or money laundering related activities.
A second major concern was the proposed idea of the Third Trusted
Party. Consult Hyperion envisaged that the data of transactions from
the UK to Somalia/Somaliland would be stored and managed by a
Third Trusted Party. However, issues relating to the nature of the
proposed entity, its location and precise function remained unclear.
During the numerous consultations and community engagements,
MSBs and Somali members of the public raised concerns around data
protection, privacy, and other security issues.
During our interviews with MSBs, directors commented on a felt
sense of injustice and unnecessary suspicion when it came to their
operational procedures and systems. An environment of distrust, they
explained, had generated suspicion between MSBs and others tasked
to address and improve the situation. Further confusion existed about
what precisely was required of MSBs in order to qualify for a bank
account. There seemed to be a certain level of frustration with the perceived lack of direction and the slow pace of developments around the
project.
In early 2015, after several delays in the timeline of the project,
issues emerged in relation to the management of the project by the
World Bank. Due to yet unknown circumstances the Safer Corridor
project ceased. Two years later, it remains unclear whether the pilot
will be ever completed. The UK government has now shifted to a more
medium-long term Safer Corridor Initiative, which will address the
structural flows of remittance flows working closely with the Central
Bank of Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia.11 The US
State Department has more recently taken control over the management of the Safer Corridor project and released a Request for Interest
to capacity build Somali financial institutions including the Central
Bank of Somalia and Somali MSBs in the Somali regions. The US Treasury is now leading the project, but further clarity and details of this
initiative are still pending.
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A. Remittance Flows Continue
Meanwhile, all MSBs with the exception of Word Remit, have now lost
their bank accounts in the UK. Prior to the bank account closures there
were three different ways (or transfer channels) to send money via
MSBs. The first, which is also the most common method used, involves
individuals sending money via their local agents, either in cash or
through digital transaction. Local agents then transfer the cash to the
MSBs’ specific bank accounts. The second is used when senders take
the money directly to the MSB’s own office and pay in cash over the
counter, and the third involves the transfer the money from the sender’s bank to the MSB’s bank account.12 In all three channels once the
MSBs receive the money in their accounts, it is transferred to a clearing
house, often in Dubai, and subsequently to Somalia or Somaliland.
These transfers are typically categorised into three miles. The first mile
involves agents depositing monies into an account of a UK MSB, which
then the MSB then transfers to a third party clearing house, often based
in the UAE. The second mile involves the settling of payments using
trade-flow mechanisms to reimburse in-country agents, and the third
mile takes place in the Somali regions where the local agent receives the
payments to settle.13
The process of transferring money has been complicated since the
closure of MSB bank accounts, as MSBs have struggled to offer transfer services for individual senders. In order to address this challenge,
MSBs have opted to work with a third party, for example MoneyCorp
or Choice,14 to collect the cash once senders deposit it with the local
agent. To complicate matters more, such third parties are offering partial services and are not willing to collect the cash from the agents but
instead insist that MSBs arrange a central collection point. This presents added labour costs due to physical cash collection but also real
and immediate risks to MSBs, their employees and the industry as a
whole. Thus far, business transactions are largely unaffected because
the Bank of Abu Dhabi has agreed to accommodate such transactions
but this may well change in the near future. Furthermore, there is the
possibility that intermediaries such as MoneyCorp and Choice may
be forced to end collaboration with MSBs if the situation in the Somali
money transfer industry does not improve.
Companies such as MoneyCorp, which provide similar services to
Somali MSBs, are fully operating in the UK, and have not been subject to the restrictions affecting Somali MSBs. Questions have been
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raised by community leaders about what they perceive as unequal
access to banking services. For example, Mohamed Ibrahim, Director
of the London Somali Youth Forum stated, “We sense unfairness in
how Somali people are treated by banks who view them as suspicious
and untrustworthy that is evident in the massive account closures
while other organisations who handle in the same exact industry are
operating freely. Can we speak of racism here?” The sense of unfair
treatment was also expressed by the SOMSA chairman who noted that
“the reality is that we are of course losing great market share due to
the closure of our bank accounts only to be picked up by rival orgnisations.” Despite these challenges remittance flows to the Somali regions
continue, albeit in a way that is less transparent and, inadvertently, can
more easily facilitate money laundering and terrorism-related activities.
IV. Regulatory Challenges
Our research has shown that MSBs at the first mile demonstrate a
greater understanding of the requirements and risks at stake, particularly owners and senior staff members in the UK, UAE and USA. Most
suggest that their current money transfer IT systems are not conducive
to acceptable standards that meet the demands of financial regulators
and compliance and financial procedures. As one senior MSB manager pointed out to us, most technical money transfer systems “are
built in-house by our own IT engineers and, therefore, most violations
are to do with the security aspects of the systems.” However, he also
reiterated a commitment to improve the services through innovative
solutions which meet regulatory obligations. This might involve, for
example, moving the MSB online (ecommerce) and dealing with operational requirements of any new IT system that is adopted, (i.e. disaster recovery, high availability, system performance, usability etc.).
That said, many MSBs indicated the need for guidance and training in
order to meet the demands of acquiring and using technical solutions
that comply with required international compliance and procedures.
Arguably, the Somali remittances industry has been slow in working
collaboratively or in offering training and guidance. Indeed, current
challenges have existed for more than a decade.
Regulators are particularly concerned about the physical transportation of large amounts of cash between the second and the third miles.
Continuous transportation of physical cash takes place at least twice a
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week from various parts of the Somali regions to Dubai and vice versa—a process which lacks transparency. The cash is carried with cabin
size bags to and from Dubai to meet the supply and demand of cash
flow. Due to the fact that the banks treat this money, albeit legally, as
foreign exchange transactions, profits of up to 2 per cent can ensue in
the transfer from US Dollar to UAE Dirham. This makes it an attractive
financial activity.
Finally, compliance regulations are of greatest concern in the last
mile. The traditional kafaala system (identification through clan membership) is still widely used as a credible form of identification. This
means if someone cannot be formerly identified during remittances
collection, s/he needs to bring a well known and/or respected clan elder
to vouch for her/him. Only those with foreign Passports (i.e. Djiboutian, Ethiopian, European, American etc.) are readily identified. In the
absence of formal identification, community contacts and clan-based
identification systems remain the most reliable means of identifying
individuals. However, this system has little credibility with Western
banks and international law-enforcement agencies. In late 2014 the
Somaliland government started to implement national ID cards, which
could also be used for identification purposes. However, this project is
still far from completion. This underpins the concerns of international
regulators in terms of KYC and AML as there are virtually no effective KYC procedures in place. While aggregated cross transactions
checks are performed in order to monitor individual behaviour when
transferring—thus enabling MSBs to identify any ‘suspicious’ transactions—the actual identity of the receiver is harder to ascertain.
V. State-owned and Newly Emerging Private Banks
Poorly functioning public financial institutions and weak governance
are major constrains for the MSB sector. The central banking systems
in Somalia and Somaliland are not developed enough to undertake
supervisory roles of monitoring the MSB system. The Somaliland Central Bank has only recently introduced a Supervisory Unit with some
capacity training provided by the World Bank. As in other sectors,
however, state institutions are far less developed than the private sector, which has flourished despite political instability in the region.
A power disparity exists between the private sector and government
institutions in Somaliland. Often private organisations make sugges-
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tions to regulate their own industry and the government abides by
this, thereby blurring accountability.
Meanwhile, the remittance market has been developing in the
Somali regions. Over the last few years, we have seen the emergence of
private banking institutions operating in the area. Salaam Bank opened
in 2009 and offers current accounts, ATM machines, web surfer cards
(prepaid), and limited credit. Dahabshiil Bank opened in late 2014,
offering general banking services including both current and business accounts. These banks issue cheques, some of which are interchangeable between these institutions. Although not internationally
recognised, due to the lack of a centralised banking system, some of
these banks can perform international transfers through recognised
corresponding banks (E.g. Salaam African Bank in Djibouti). These
transactions are, however, slow and expensive. Some have been working towards providing a swift system, but this has not yet materialised.
Furthermore, these banks tend to service businesses but are less likely
to service NGOs or individuals, due to the high costs involved, and
the fact that remittance companies offer similar and cheaper services.
All banks currently operating in Somaliland have been awarded Sharia-compliant licenses, in the absence of a commercial banking law in
the country.
These licenses enable them to offer a wide range of services in order
to meet the increasing local demand. Central to the Sharia based banking is the absence of interest charges on economic transactions and a
duty to avoid reckless risk-taking.
A key development of the last few years has been the expansion of
mobile money systems such as ZAAD and E-Dahab in Somaliland,
EVC Plus in South Central Somalia, Sahal in Puntland, as well as the
more recently established Taaj. These companies currently present a
huge threat to the existence of traditional remittance business models
described above. Mobile money is becoming increasingly entrenched
across the Somali regions, especially in urban areas and among
younger generations. Many recipients of remittances are now accustomed to mobile money and that service is currently solely controlled
by telcos such as Telesom, Gollis and Hormood. There have also been
connections between MSBs, Telcos and Banks. The Zaad system, for
example, is a platform provided by Telesom, which also links up with
Salaam Bank accounts. Money that is held in a Salaam bank account
can be transferred to an individual’s ZAAD mobile phone account,
and vice versa. A limited number of traditional MSBs, including Mus-
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taqbal and Tawakal, have also joined up with Zaad so that remitted
money can be directly sent to the recipients’ mobile phone. Similarly,
mobile platforms EVC and Sahal are owned by companies Hormuud
and Golis respectively. Telesom, Hormuud and Golis, although operating with great local independence and ownership, are linked to its
pioneer and prominent shareholder Mr Ahmed Nur Jim’ale. Inspired
by the large network of Mr Ahmed Nur Jim’ale, Taaj has recently penetrated the international market, enabling diaspora Somalis to directly
send their money to the intended recipients across the Somali regions.
The upsurge in mobile money infrastructure and use can in great
part be associated with the failure to address the challenges in the
remittances industry after massive account closures by banks and the
ongoing demand for money transfer services. Furthermore, mobile
money services transfer money quickly, cheaply, efficiently and
through transparent procedures. Having said that, greater scepticism
exists about the reliability of the mobile money infrastructure among
users. Local people in Somaliland use the term ha igu dhixin that translates as “do not [keep it on the phone] overnight.” Discussions with
young Somalilanders revealed their lack of trust that ZAAD money
was real money. As one young female user in Somaliland explained
to us, “it’s just a number on my phone! How do I know it’s actual
money?” In sum, most people ensure that the money they receive on
their phones is immediately transferred to a bank account to avoid
potential loss of funds in the event of a system failure. Despite these
suspicions, MSBs are beginning to realise the importance of mobile
money, and are recognising the need for a mobile money platform that
can compete with existing Telcos.
Another question is whether mobile money can effectively provide
a substitute for traditional MSBs cash transfers. As mentioned, mobile
money is widespread in urban areas and amongst youth, but less so in
rural parts of the country, and among older Somalis. Those who are
not able to operate a mobile phone (often older women) rely on other
family members who are able to do so, charging them with the responsibility of managing their money. A final concern with the remittance
closures was the extent to which the development industry, NGOs
and charities working in the Somali regions, were reliant on remittance companies to process salaries to their own employees, but also
to process their cash transfers to the rural poor. This continues to be a
concern.
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VI. Concluding Remarks and The Future
The main challenges facing the Somali money transfer industry can be
largely attributed to two main factors. First, there are concerns around
compliance and how to meet international financial regulations. Second, the lack of professionally operating banking systems in the Somali
regions does not only exacerbate the problems but is part and parcel of
the chain of critical challenges facing Somali MSBs. So what can be
done and how can these challenges be addressed in the immediate and
long term?
There is a need for professional, sound and well-regulated financial
banking systems that meet global standards across the Somali regions.
It is therefore important to aid the Central Banks of Somalia and
Somaliland, in developing regulatory and supervisory mechanisms to
ensure that current legislation is implemented effectively. A functioning and well-regulated financial banking system will enable proper
checks and balances to be carried out through the Central Banks,
which, in turn, should restore trust in the Somali financial industry as
a whole. More importantly, a well-regulated banking system across the
Somali regions would ensure that money laundering and the financing
of terrorism are curbed.
Additionally, a Central Know Your Customer System (CKYCS) with
biometric identification to meet international standards, which MSBs
can share for critical identification processes, could serve as a viable option to mitigate compliance risks. Some challenges in terms of
trust in relation to a shared data platform are foreseeable. These could
potentially be addressed by including the Somali Money Services
Association (SOMSA) in the process. Widespread scepticism about
financial data management and ownership needs to be addressed in
order to bring important industry stakeholders on board.
Furthermore, the physical transportation of cash to and from Dubai,
while not unlawful, needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency to
ensure greater transparency and accountability. A more stable centralised banking system in the Somali regions would undoubtedly rectify this.
Finally, any development towards capacity building or training
should take cognisance of all three miles and their interconnections.
Only by so doing can we work towards the creation of a fully functioning Safer Corridor which meets international financial regulations.
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Notes
1. This paper is based on research carried out in London, Dubai, Hargeysa, Somaliland
by the authors between 2014–15. Mohamed Aden Hassan carried out three focus groups
with members of Somali Money Services Associations (SOMSA) UK and an in depth
interview with the chair Mr Micin Ali. He also conducted interviews in Dubai and
Hargeysa with the owners and senior mangers of twelve MSBs as well as senior staff
members of leading Telcos including Telesom, NationLink and the director of Somaliland Association of Telcom Operators. Furthermore, essential discussions were carried
out with ZAAD’s senior staff, Salaam Bank, and Governor of Somaliland Bank as well
as four Somaliland Government Ministers and political leaders, a board member of the
Somaliland Electoral Commission and directors of four local NGOs. Giulia Liberatore
conducted interviews in 2013 with directors of Somali MSBs, community activists and
other stakeholders involved in the Safer Corridor Pilot Project in London. She also
interviewed government officials, directors of MSBs and of other financial institutions
in Hargeysa, Somaliland. This research was conducted as part of the project entitled
‘Diaspora engagement in war torn societies,’ funded by the Leverhulme Trust under the
Oxford Diasporas Programme.
2. However, in early June all 13 licenses were reinstated by the Central Bank of Kenya
after it had carried out due diligence on critical compliance matters concluding that
financial regulations were satisfied.
3. Lindley, A and Mosley, J. (2014) Challenges for the Somali Money Transfer Sector.
Nairobi, Kenya: Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, pages 4–5.
4. Hammond, L. et al (2013) Family Ties: Remittances and Livelihoods Support in Puntland and Somaliland. Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit—Somalia. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that actual numbers far more exceed 2 billion per year.
5. Watkins, K & Quattri, M (2014) Lost in intermediation: How excessive charges undermine the benefits of remittances for Africa. ODI.
6. World Remit operates online and remains the only organization that is able to escape
the account closures. Its model eliminates actual cash transfers while meeting all the
necessary international financial regulations. In general financial regulators argue
that greater cash flows and circulations undermine important compliance procedures
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whereas online money transfers offer more transparency which satisfies regulatory
demands.
7. Oxfam (2015) Hanging by a Thread: The Ongoing threat to Somalia’s remittance lifeline and Oxfam (2014) Keeping the Lifeline Open: Remittances and Markets in Somalia.
8. Dfid (2015) Safer Corridor Pilot for UK-Somali Remittances: Stakeholder Engagement
Summary: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/418688/15-03-20_SCP_Stakeholder_Engagement_Summary.pdf
9. Several other consultancy projects were commissioned throughout the duration of the
project. For example, Beechwood International were funded to produce the ‘Safer Corridors Rapid Assessment: Somalia and UK’ report in 2013.
11.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/348648/Money-laundering-guidance-for-money-service-businesses.pdf
12. For an update on the UK government’s involvement in the Safer Corridor Project and
Initiative see: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/471064/UK-Somalia_Safer_Corridor_Initiative.pdf
13. In addition, MSBs cater for business customers including (I)NGOs, which normally
involves a bank to bank transfer. For further information on how the remittance system
works see A. Lindley (2009) ‘Between ‘dirty money’ and ‘development capital’: Somali
money transfer infrastructure under global scrutiny,’ African Affairs, 108 (433), and
M.H. Hassan and C. Chalmers (2008) UK-Somali Remittances Survey. Dfid
14. MoneyCorp is a UK-based company which offers foreign exchange services to individuals and companies, and Choice is a payment service provider which offers a range
of payment options—from bank account transfers, to cash pick-ups and mobile wallet
top ups.
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